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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 11-1619, 11-1620, 11-1621, 11-1622 
___________ 
 
FRANK McCANN; EILEEN McCANN, H/W; 
FRANK TROTTI; TONIA TROTTI, H/W; 
JEFF OSBORNE; TIMOTHY GRANDFIELD; JOSEPH CARBONE 
 
v. 
 
STEVE MILLER, Grand Lodge Representative, 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS 
AND AEROSPACE WORKERS; 
THOMAS BUFFENBARGER, President, 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS 
AND AEROSPACE WORKERS  LOCAL 1776; 
ROBERT ROACH, General Vice President, 
International Association of Machinists; 
LYNN TUCKER, General Vice President, 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; 
DAVID MESSER; KENNETH MILLARD; JERRY MOLINARI; 
JACK JOHNSON; PATRICK STACK; JAMES STROUSE; 
VINCENT TROIL; JOHN DORAN; WAYNE GALLAGHER; 
JOEL HEITMAN; RICHARD HOWELL; EDWARD LONGWELL; 
JAMES LUX; JASON McGUIGAN; ANTHONY ARMIDEO; 
MARK BIONI; ROBERT BOLAND; ROBERT CARR; 
VINCENT CERASO; JON CONNER; MICHAEL DEJESSE; 
PHILADELPHIA AIRPORT HOTEL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; 
MARRIOTT HOTEL SERVICES, INC.; 
ELPIZIO LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; DAVID STRANGE 
 
Frank McCann and Eileen McCann, 
Appellants at No. 11-1619 
 
Jeffrey Osborne, 
Appellant at No. 11-1620 
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Frank Trotti; Jeffrey Osborne; Joseph Carbon; Timothy Granfield, 
Appellants at No. 11-1621 
 
International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers Local Lodge 1776, 
Appellant at No. 11-1622 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-00561 
(Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 10, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 22, 2012) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 These consolidated cases appeal judgments and orders in a civil action brought by 
union members against members of a rival union and the union‟s local and international 
branches to recover for injuries suffered in a physical attack at a union meeting in 
Philadelphia. After trial, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs, finding several 
individual union members and the local union liable for over $800,000 in damages.
1
 But 
all plaintiffs (Frank and Eileen McCann, Frank Trotti, Joseph Carbon, Timothy 
                                              
1
 The jury awarded $211,492.81 to Frank McCann, $111,400.90 to Frank Trotti, 
$276,683.51 to Jeff Osborne, $158,997.93 to Timothy Grandfield, and $53,403.00 to 
Joseph Carbon.  
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Grandfield, and Jeff Osborne) appeal the court‟s grant of summary judgment to the 
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“IAM” or “Grand 
Lodge”), and some challenge the court‟s decision to bifurcate the trial. Plaintiff Jeff 
Osborne separately appeals the court‟s exclusion of expert medical testimony on 
causation and prognosis for injuries he suffered in the attack. Defendant Local Lodge 
1776, which represents Philadelphia-area members of the IAM, appeals the District 
Court‟s denial of its motions for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, for a 
new trial. We will affirm the District Court on each of these issues.  
I. 
This litigation arises out of a conflict between two unions—the IAM and the 
Transport Workers Union (TWU)—over union representation of airline employees 
following the merger of U.S. Airways and America West. Prior to the merger, U.S. 
Airways employees were primarily represented by the IAM and America West 
employees by the TWU. In anticipation of the merger, plaintiffs, who were union 
organizers for the TWU, sought to recruit new members by holding several informational 
meetings. On the morning of February 8, 2006, shortly before one of these meetings, a 
group affiliated with the IAM threatened and then assaulted plaintiffs in a conference 
room at the Philadelphia Airport Marriott. Several TWU members were injured. 
The IAM is structured in three tiers. The top tier is known as the Grand Lodge. 
The intermediate tier is comprised of several regional District Lodges. The lowest tier is 
made up of over one thousand Local Lodges. Each District and Local Lodge is a separate 
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and autonomous entity, with its own officers, governance, and treasury; they are not 
authorized to speak or act on behalf of the IAM.  
The injured TWU members brought this suit against the individual IAM members 
who allegedly planned or participated in the attack as well as the local entity of the IAM 
to which the attackers belonged, Local Lodge 1776 (“Local 1776”), and the Grand Lodge 
of the IAM. These consolidated appeals challenge the judgments and orders of the 
District Court at several stages of the ensuing civil proceedings. 
After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The 
District Court determined that the Grand Lodge of the IAM could not be held liable for 
the attack under the Norris-LaGuardia Act‟s heightened vicarious liability standard, but 
left the question of Local 1776‟s vicarious liability to the jury. Plaintiffs appeal the grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the IAM.  
 Shortly before trial, Osborne notified defendants that he intended to have his 
treating physicians offer expert testimony on causation and prognosis. Defendants 
objected because of late notice. The court excluded the expert testimony and Osborne 
appeals.  
 At the close of trial, the verdict sheet adopted by the District Court charged the 
jury to determine whether Local 1776 was liable for punitive damages, leaving the 
amount of punitive damages, if any were warranted, to be determined after a second trial 
before the same jury. The jury found Local 1776 liable for the plaintiffs‟ injuries, but 
found punitive damages unwarranted. Trotti had opposed this bifurcation and now 
appeals.  
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 After the verdict, Local 1776 filed motions for judgment as a matter of law under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 and for a new trial under Rule 59(b). Concluding that the evidence 
supported the verdict, the District Court denied these motions. Local 1776 appeals.
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II. 
A. 
Plaintiffs argue the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 
the IAM because they presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find it vicariously liable 
for the attack. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all inferences 
in favor of the nonmoving party. Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).  
McCann contends the court erred in applying the heightened burden of proof of 
Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (“NLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 106, in assessing the 
liability of the IAM at summary judgment. But the court correctly determined that to 
establish the IAM‟s liability for the tort claims here the plaintiffs must meet the NLA‟s 
heightened evidentiary standard. Section 6 of the NLA governs the liability of unions for 
the actions of union members in federal adjudications of state law tort claims arising out 
of labor disputes.
3
 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 737 (1966). Because 
                                              
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
3
 According to McCann, the clear proof standard is inapplicable because of the 
subsequent passage of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), which 
purportedly restored the ordinary standard of agency, implicitly repealing the heightened 
§ 6 standard. But in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), the Supreme 
Court explained that “[Congress] did not repeal § 6 outright, but left it applicable to cases 
not arising under the new Act . . . . Plainly, § 6 applies to federal court adjudications of 
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plaintiffs‟ claims rest solely on state tort law and arise out of a labor dispute, they are 
plainly covered by § 6. Nevertheless, McCann contends that once a local union—like 
Local 1776 here—has been found vicariously liable under § 6, the international union can 
be held vicariously liable under a simple preponderance of the evidence standard. We 
find no support for this proposition in case law and decline to embrace it here.
4
 The 
question is not whether the IAM can be held liable for the actions of the Local, but 
whether the IAM can be held liable for the actions of the individual members who 
participated in the attack. Section 6 of the NLA governs the liability of the IAM for the 
actions of its members. 
Under Section 6, a plaintiff must show by “clear proof” that the defendant 
organization or member “actually participated, gave prior authorization, or ratified [the 
offense] after actual knowledge of [its] perpetration.” United Bhd. of Carpenters v. 
United States, 330 U.S. 395, 403 (1947). To establish authorization, plaintiffs must prove 
“that the particular act charged,” or acts like it, “had been expressly authorized, or 
necessarily followed from a granted authority.” Id. at 406-07. To establish ratification, 
plaintiffs must show “either that the union approved the violence which occurred, or that 
it participated actively or by knowing tolerance in further acts which were in themselves 
actionable under state law or intentionally drew upon the previous violence for their 
                                                                                                                                                  
state tort claims arising out of labor disputes, whether or not they are associated with 
claims under [LMRA] § 303 to which the section does not apply.” Id. at 736-37; see also 
C & K Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 704 F.2d 690, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1983); Kerry 
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 637 F.2d 957, 964 (3d Cir. 1981). 
4
  In support of this argument, McCann cites only a footnote in Gibbs. But the footnote 
does not endorse the argument, rather it merely acknowledges that the “argument might 
be made.” 383 U.S. at 737 n.28.  
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force.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 739. On summary judgment, the court must determine whether 
the evidence presented would allow a jury to reasonably find for the plaintiff or defendant 
under this heightened evidentiary standard.
5
 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 255 (1986); Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Babayan, 430 F.3d 121, 129 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(citation omitted).  
Even under the NLA‟s heightened burden, plaintiffs contend they presented 
sufficient evidence to create a question of fact on IAM‟s liability. There is some case law 
that a union may authorize or ratify an act “without going so far as to openly encourage 
or embrace the tactics of its official representative.” Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, 
Chauffeurs & Helpers Local, 883 F.2d 132, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1989). And “„proof of 
authorization or ratification can be based upon circumstantial evidence,‟” provided that 
proof is clear. Id. (quoting James R. Snyder Co. v. Edward Rose & Sons, Inc., 546 F.2d 
206 (6th Cir. 1976)). As the District Court found, however, the evidence was insufficient 
to allow a jury to find, by “clear proof,” that the IAM had participated in, authorized, or 
ratified the attack.  
                                              
5
 Trotti cites our decision in Altemose Constr. Co. v. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 751 
F.2d 653, 655-56 (3d Cir. 1985), for the proposition that on summary judgment the 
inquiry for liability under the NLA is limited to whether inferences “of union 
authorization, participation in, or ratification of the acts complained of . . . are, under the 
evidence, logically permissible.” But the Supreme Court has since held that where a 
heightened evidentiary standard would apply at trial, “the trial judge‟s summary 
judgment inquiry as to whether a genuine issue exists will be whether the evidence 
presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for 
either the plaintiff or the defendant.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 
(1986). Accordingly, the question is whether the evidence would logically support a 
jury‟s finding of authorization, participation, or ratification “by clear proof.” This is the 
question the District Court asked.  
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Plaintiffs claim that in reaching this conclusion the court ignored much of the 
circumstantial evidence and failed to consider the cumulative impact of the totality of the 
evidence they submitted. According to plaintiffs, that evidence, considered as a whole, 
would permit a jury to find vicarious liability under the NLA. Plaintiffs‟ argument centers 
on the role of four individuals in the events surrounding the attack: Vincent Addeo and 
Anthony Armideo, both credentialed representatives of the IAM who were present at the 
Marriott hotel on the day of the attack; Steven Miller, a vice president of District Lodge 
141, who allegedly threatened plaintiffs some days prior to the attack; and Robert 
Boland, president of Local 1776. 
Plaintiffs argue a reasonable jury could conclude Miller, Armideo, and Addeo 
were acting on behalf of the IAM and therefore the IAM authorized or participated in the 
attack on plaintiffs. Starting with Miller, plaintiffs point to testimony that, two days 
before the attack, he warned Osborne, Carbon, and McCann at a meeting in Boston that if 
they went to Philadelphia they would need bullet proof vests and would be “lucky to get 
out of there alive.” App. 654, 910, 920, 940-41. But, plaintiffs failed to establish a link 
between these alleged threats and the Grand Lodge of the IAM. The only evidence in the 
record demonstrates that Miller “never received instructions from anyone in the Grand 
Lodge about the Boston meeting,” App. at 264, 558, and attended the meeting on behalf 
of District Lodge 141. Accordingly, there is no evidence Miller was acting on behalf of 
the IAM.   
 Nor is there evidence Armideo was acting on behalf of the IAM. McCann asserts 
that Roach, an IAM vice president, had delegated to Stephen Canale, the president of 
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District Lodge 141, the task of combating the Teamsters and TWU organizing efforts, 
who in turn delegated that task to Armideo. McCann Br. at 11. While it is true that 
Canale had assigned Armideo to work on the TWU campaign, the record contains no 
evidence that any officer of the Grand Lodge had delegated this responsibility to Canale. 
The fact that Armideo introduced himself as an IAM representative is not evidence he 
was acting on behalf of the IAM. At issue is Armideo‟s actual authority, not his apparent 
authority.
 6
  
That Armideo carried an IAM credential card similarly does not establish that he 
acted on behalf of the Grand Lodge in this instance. The credential states that the carrier 
“is duly authorized to represent the Grand Lodge . . . in all matters to which he/she may 
be assigned . . . .” App. at 314. But, as the District Court noted, there is no evidence 
Armideo had been assigned to represent the Grand Lodge in the union dispute that 
resulted in the February 8 attack. 
Plaintiffs‟ evidence regarding Addeo is stronger, but still insufficient. First, as just 
discussed, the fact Addeo carried an IAM credential card is not evidence he was acting on 
behalf of the IAM in this instance. Next, plaintiffs point to a letter from Robert Roach, 
Jr., an IAM General Vice President, authorizing Addeo to act with the full authority of 
the IAM in preventing a raid by the Teamsters Organization. As the District Court noted, 
however, this letter was expressly limited to a conflict with the Teamsters union, not the 
TWU. It did not confer a general authority on Addeo to combat any organizing efforts by 
                                              
6
 The parties dispute whether this statement was inadmissible hearsay if offered to show 
that Armideo was in fact an IAM representative. IAM Br. at 42. 
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opposing unions. Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend this letter is evidence IAM authorized 
or participated in the attack because a reasonable jury could infer the letter implicitly 
gave Addeo authority to combat the organizing efforts of the TWU, which were related to 
the efforts of the Teamsters.  
Plaintiffs also argue Addeo‟s invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights during his 
deposition when asked about his role in the assault gives rise to the inference that he was 
protecting the IAM. Only one of these questions - with whom he spoke at the Grand 
Lodge about the attack - had anything to do with the IAM. But even these strained 
inferences cannot constitute clear proof IAM authorized or participated in the attack.  
Plaintiffs also argue that IAM should be held liable on a ratification theory, 
contending its failure to discipline Boland and Armideo and retaining them in union 
positions after their arrest in connection with the February 8 attack proves the union 
ratified the attack. To bolster this theory, McCann argues that keeping Armideo and 
Boland in office violates 29 U.S.C. § 504, which prohibits, inter alia, persons convicted 
of assault resulting in grievous bodily injury from holding union positions. This argument 
fails. First, the prohibition in 29 U.S.C. § 504 applies to convictions for assaults resulting 
in grievous bodily injury, such as aggravated assault under Pennsylvania law. See 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2702. Boland and Armideo were convicted of simple assault, a crime 
without the element of grievous bodily injury. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701. Moreover, 
the union‟s failure to discipline the pair is an internal union matter, see United 
Steelworkers v. Lorain, 616 F.2d 919, 923 (6th Cir. 1980), and does not constitute clear 
proof “that the union approved the violence which occurred.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 739. 
11 
 
The IAM asserts its failure to discipline these members was based on the constraints on 
union discipline imposed by the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(5), 529, and the 
provisions of the IAM Constitution, App. at 567. Plaintiffs point to no evidence 
indicating the actual reason for the union‟s failure to discipline was its approval of the 
February 8 attack. 
Nor do the other facts cited in the plaintiffs‟ briefs preclude summary judgment in 
favor of the IAM. We conclude the plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence to allow a 
jury to find the IAM vicariously liable under the NLA‟s clear proof standard. The District 
Court gave close consideration to the plaintiffs‟ evidence and properly concluded the 
evidence fell short. 
B. 
 For its part, Local 1776 appeals the District Court‟s denial of its motion for 
judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, contending the evidence did not 
support the jury‟s finding of vicarious liability. Judgment as a matter of law is proper 
only where “a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds 
that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the 
party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). In entertaining a Rule 50 motion, a court 
should review the record as a whole, but disregard all evidence favorable to the moving 
party that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 
530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000). “[T]he court should give credence to the evidence favoring the 
nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted 
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and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested 
witnesses.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
 Local 1776 contends the court erred in stating that the evidentiary burden for 
establishing liability under § 6 of the NLA required “clear proof,” when the jury charge 
stated a standard of “clear and convincing evidence” and the Supreme Court has referred 
to the standard as being “clear, unequivocal and convincing.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 737. But 
“clear proof” is the precise language of the statute; it is the applicable standard. The 
alternative formulations of this standard in the jury charge and in Gibbs were offered as 
synonyms of “clear proof.” We find no indication that the jury or District Court applied 
the wrong standard. 
Local 1776 also contends the record as a whole did not contain evidence sufficient 
to support the jury‟s finding of liability. According to Local 1776, the District Court was 
dismissive of the uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence in its favor and gave too 
much weight, in particular, to evidence establishing that Boland was president of Local 
1776.
7
 Yet in making this argument on appeal, Local 1776 largely relies on testimony 
                                              
7
 Local 1776 takes issue with the District Court‟s determination that “[t]he jury was not 
required to ignore the fact that Boland was also President of Local 1776, and that those 
who were taken out of work and involved in the assault were members of Local 1776.” 
App. at 47. Apparently, Local 1776 would have the jury ignore this evidence because it 
does not establish that Local 1776 authorized “the particular act charged, or acts 
generally of that type and quality.” See Carpenters, 330 U.S. at 406-07. But to say that 
certain evidence does not by itself establish authorization is quite different from saying 
the evidence ought to be ignored. This evidence lent support to the jury‟s conclusion that 
Local 1776 had authorized the attack. 
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offered by an interested witness or contradicted elsewhere in the record.
8
  
Local 1776 also points to a purported contradiction between the jury‟s finding the 
individual defendants had exhibited extreme and outrageous conduct and its finding 
Local 1776, while liable, had not acted in an outrageous, malicious, wanton, willful, 
oppressive, or recklessly indifferent manner. These two findings are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. In ruling on defendant‟s motion for judgment as a matter of law, the 
District Court carefully reviewed the record and found the evidence sufficient to support 
the jury‟s conclusion that Local 1776 was liable. We agree.  
We also affirm the denial of Local 1776‟s motion for a new trial. “[N]ew trials 
because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence are proper only when the record 
shows that the jury‟s verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on 
the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience.” Williamson v. Consol. 
Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir. 1991). There is nothing shocking in the jury 
finding Local 1776 liable for plaintiffs‟ injuries. As the District Court held, that 
conclusion had ample support in the record. 
                                              
8
 For example, in arguing that during the events surrounding the February 8 attack 
Boland acted on behalf of District Lodge 141 rather than Local 1776, Local 1776 cites 
evidence showing that Boland was the chief steward of District Lodge 141. Local 1776 
Br. at 27 (citing App. at 1552-53). But in his own testimony, Boland twice stated that he 
never held a position with District Lodge 141. App. at 1730, 1738. Moreover, much of 
the testimony cited by Local 1776 in this appeal was offered by an interested witness, 
Armideo, whom the jury was not required to believe. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151. The 
Local claims that Armideo‟s testimony should not be discounted as that of an interested 
witness because his self-interest as a codefendant facing a large judgment would favor 
imposing liability on Local 1776. But we need not parse how competing interests might 
have influenced Armideo‟s testimony. That task was properly left to the jury. 
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C. 
Trotti argues the District Court erred in bifurcating the question of liability for 
punitive damages from the amount of punitive damages. At the close of the trial, Trotti 
contested the bifurcation of these questions and requested that the jury consider the 
questions simultaneously. 
We review the decision to bifurcate the trial for abuse of discretion. Barr Labs., 
Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 978 F.2d 98, 105 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Here, the court 
was understandably concerned that the jury‟s knowledge of the defendant‟s net worth 
might influence its assessment of compensatory damages. While a defendant‟s net worth 
is relevant in assessing the amount of punitive damages, it should not bear on 
compensatory damages. In this case, Local 1776 hoped to present evidence of its meager 
assets. To forestall possible confusion or prejudice, the court bifurcated the trial. App. at 
1496. We see no abuse of discretion.  
Trotti also argues that, in granting the motion to bifurcate the punitive damages 
issue, the court should have informed the jury that, if it was necessary, the trial on the 
amount of punitive damages would be very brief. The court declined, explaining that it 
believed the jury instructions had been clear and that it did not wish to overemphasize the 
punitive damages aspect of the case. We see no abuse of discretion. 
D. 
Finally, we consider Osborne‟s challenge to the District Court‟s exclusion of 
expert testimony by his treating physicians on causation and prognosis for his injuries. 
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A), “a party must disclose to the other parties the identity 
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of any witness it may use at trial to present [expert evidence].” As the court noted, 
plaintiffs‟ counsel failed to notify defense counsel that treating physicians would offer 
expert testimony. App. at 26-27. “„The trial court‟s exclusion of testimony because of the 
failure of counsel to adhere to a pretrial order will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 
clear abuse of discretion.‟” Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 719 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (quoting Semper v. Santos, 845 F.2d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1988)). To determine 
whether a district court abused its discretion, we consider:  
(1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the excluded 
witnesses would have testified, (2) the ability of that party to cure the prejudice, 
(3) the extent to which waiver of the rule against calling unlisted witnesses would 
disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case or other cases in the court, and (4) 
bad faith or wilfulness in failing to comply with the district court‟s order.  
 
Id. (quoting Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass’n, 559 F.2d 894, 904-05 
(3d Cir. 1977)). In addition to these factors, we consider “the importance of the excluded 
testimony[,] . . . [for] the exclusion of critical evidence is an extreme sanction, not 
normally to be imposed absent a showing of willful deception or flagrant disregard of a 
court order by the proponent of the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  
Defendants would have faced substantial prejudice if the expert testimony were 
permitted because plaintiffs did not notify them of their intent to call the treating 
physicians as expert witnesses until shortly before trial. Defendants did not have time to 
depose the proposed experts nor find their own experts to rebut the proposed testimony. 
On these facts, the trial judge was not obliged to postpone the trial. Significantly, the 
District Court did not bar the treating physicians from offering any testimony. The court 
16 
 
permitted the physicians to testify on “their observations, information they received from 
their patients, . . . the extent of their examination,” and their diagnoses. App. at 28.  
Nevertheless, Osborne contends the expert testimony should not have been 
excluded without considering whether he had substantial justification for failing to 
comply with the disclosure requirements, citing conflicting authority on whether a 
treating physician must submit a report that satisfies the expert witness requirements of 
Rule 26.
9
 But he had no justification for failing to disclose that he intended to have the 
treating physicians offer expert testimony. Rule 26(a)(2)(A) unambiguously required that 
disclosure.  
“[W]e have generally upheld trial courts‟ imposition of sanctions excluding 
witnesses because of the district court‟s need for broad leeway to manage its cases,” In re 
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 792 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted), and the 
wisdom of this general rule applies here. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
barring the causation and prognosis testimony of Osborne‟s treating physicians.  
III.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
                                              
9
 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (mandating that a written report accompany the expert 
disclosure “if the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert 
testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party‟s employee regularly involve 
giving expert testimony.”). 
